
On the evening of March 24, 2026, United Airlines Flight 589—a Boeing 737-800 carrying 168 passengers and crew from San Francisco—narrowly avoided a midair collision while on final approach to John Wayne Airport (SNA) in Santa Ana, California. A California Army National Guard UH-60 Black Hawk helicopter (callsign Knife 25), conducting a routine training mission, crossed directly through the aircraft’s approach path (Aerotime, 2026; FAA, 2026).
Flight data shows the two aircraft came within approximately 525 feet vertically and 1,422 feet laterally, triggering a Traffic Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) Resolution Advisory—the most urgent cockpit warning. The United pilots responded immediately, leveling off and restoring separation before continuing to a safe landing minutes later (Aerotime, 2026).
This was not a routine buffer—it was a near breakdown of separation standards in congested airspace.
The incident is under FAA investigation, including whether recently tightened rules governing “visual separation” between helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft were properly applied (FAA, 2026).
It follows the January 2025 midair collision near Washington, D.C., in which an Army Black Hawk and a commercial aircraft collided, killing 67 people—a tragedy later determined to be preventable and linked to systemic failures in airspace coordination (NTSB, 2025).
Taken together, these events point to a persistent structural risk:
These are not isolated incidents. They are indicators of a system under strain.
At the international level, standards governing airspace integration, separation, and coordination are shaped by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). Yet the United States currently lacks a Senate-confirmed Representative on the ICAO Council—limiting its influence over evolving global aviation safety standards.
This is a leadership vacuum at the exact moment the system is showing stress.
Each day without strong U.S. representation at ICAO is a day where global standards—standards that directly affect U.S. airspace and passengers—advance without decisive American input.
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee should act without delay to confirm Captain Jeffrey Anderson as U.S. Representative to ICAO with the rank of Ambassador.
Delay is no longer neutral—it carries operational risk.The next near miss may not resolve safely.
EPAS Leadership Team